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Mesurer le bien-être social à partir de l’absence de privation 
Une investigation empirique 
Résumé 
Le critère de Lorenz généralisé est largement utilisé pour effectuer des comparaisons de 
bien-être au sein et entre pays sur la base de leurs distributions de revenu. Des études 
expérimentales ont contesté cette manière de procéder en montrant que le principe des 
transferts, qui sous-tend le critère de Lorenz généralisé, ne rencontre pas dans le public le 
large consensus auquel les théoriciens auraient pu s’attendre. Nous proposons de remplacer 
le critère de Lorenz généralisé par le critère de non-privation introduit par S.R. Chakravarty 
(Keio Economic Studies 34 (1997), 17–32). Ce critère est moins exigeant que le critère de 
Lorenz généralisé car il s’appuie sur une version plus faible du principe des transferts et il est 
par conséquent plus à même d’être accepté par le public. Nous utilisons les distributions de 
revenus de 17 pays fournies par le Luxembourg Income Study pour évaluer empiriquement 
les capacités de discrimination des critères de Lorenz généralisé et de non-privation. Bien que 
le quasi-ordre de non-privation soit moins décisif que le critère de Lorenz généralisé, nous 
montrons qu’il engendre un classement des distributions pratiquement identique à celui qui 
résulte de l’application du critère de Lorenz généralisé. 
Mots-clés : Transferts progressifs, Bien-être social, Inégalité, Privation 
 
The Absence of Deprivation as a Measure of Social Well-Being 
An Empirical Investigation 
Abstract 
The generalised Lorenz criterion is widely used for making welfare comparisons within and 
across  countries  on  the  basis  of  their  income  distributions.  Experimental  studies  have 
challenged this way of proceeding by showing that the principle of transfers, which underlies 
the  generalised  Lorenz  criterion,  does  not  meet  with  widespread  agreement  among  the 
public that theorists would have expected. We propose to substitute the non-deprivation 
quasi-ordering introduced by S.R. Chakravarty (Keio Economic Studies 34 (1997), 17–32) for 
the generalised Lorenz criterion. This criterion is less demanding than the generalised Lorenz 
criterion as it builds on a weaker version of the principle of transfers and it is therefore more 
likely to be accepted by the public. We use income data from the Luxembourg Income Study 
for 17 countries in order to contrast the generalised Lorenz and the non-deprivation criteria. 
Although  the  non-deprivation  quasi-ordering  is  less decisive  than  the  generalised  Lorenz 
criterion, it is shown that the former approximates the latter surprisingly well. 
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1. Introduction
There is a widespread agreement in the literature to appeal to the generalised Lorenz domi-
nance criterion for making welfare comparisons across societies starting with their distributions
of income (see Kolm (1969), Shorrocks (1983)). Much of the attractiveness of the generalised
Lorenz criterion – beyond its simplicity and elegance – stems from its association with the
principle of transfers, according to which any transfer from a richer individual to a poorer one
that does not modify their respective positions on the income scale – a so-called progressive
transfer – reduces inequality and increases welfare. However, notwithstanding its wide appli-
cation in theoretical and empirical work, the approach based on the Lorenz curve is neither
the only possibility nor immune to criticism.
On the one hand, the ability of the principle of transfers to capture the very idea of in-
equality has been challenged by a number of experimental studies, all of which ﬁnd that a
large proportion of respondents reject it (see, e.g., Amiel and Cowell (1999)). On the other
hand, there is evidence that the social status of an individual – approximated for instance by
her position in the social hierarchy – plays an important role in her appraisal of her well-being
(see, e.g., Weiss and Fershtman (1998)). Attitudes such as envy or resentment have been ar-
gued to be important components of individual judgements that might be taken into account
in the assessment of alternative situations. The notion of individual deprivation originating
in Runciman (1966) accommodates such views by making the individual’s own appraisal of a
given social state depend on her situation compared with the situations of all the individuals
who are treated more favourably than her.
Chateauneuf and Moyes (2006) have shown that, if the distributions have equal means, then
the idea of deprivation can be captured by the generalised Gini social welfare function due to
Yaari (1987) provided that suitable conditions be imposed. Furthermore, they have proposed
a stronger version of the notion of a progressive transfer – the so-called uniform on the right
transfer – having the property that overall deprivation decreases when one distribution is
obtained from another by means of a ﬁnite sequence of such transformations, and conversely.
Contrary to a progressive transfer, where the positions of the individuals involved play no role,
a uniform on the right progressive transfer imposes a minimum amount of solidarity among
the donors: if some income is taken from an individual, then the same amount has to be taken
from every non poorer individual. Dispensing with the equal mean restriction, Magdalou and
Moyes (2009) have shown that the non-deprivation quasi-ordering constitutes the analogue of
the generalised Lorenz quasi-ordering when attention is paid to deprivation.1
By deﬁnition the non-deprivation quasi-ordering is ethically less demanding than the stan-
dard generalised Lorenz quasi-ordering as it relies on weaker value judgments. As a conse-
quence, if a distribution is ranked above another one by the non-deprivation quasi-ordering,
then so it is by the generalised Lorenz quasi-ordering. Thus, the greater acceptability of the
non-deprivation quasi-ordering is counterbalanced by the fact that it is likely to produce rank-
ings less clearcut than those produced by the generalised Lorenz quasi-ordering. It is then
natural to question how far away the ranking generated by the non-deprivation criterion will
be from that implied by the application of the generalised Lorenz test in practice. The paper
addresses this question empirically by contrasting the rankings of distributions one obtains
1 It is fair to note that the non-deprivation quasi-ordering was initially proposed by Chakravarty (1997) who
called it the satisfaction quasi-ordering (see Magdalou and Moyes (2009) for a discussion).
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starting with the non-deprivation quasi-ordering and related criteria with those obtained when
building on the generalised Lorenz quasi-ordering. To this aim we have chosen to measure
well-being and inequality in 17 countries using income data from the Luxembourg Income
Study (LIS) for years 1999–2000.
We present in Section 2 the diﬀerent quasi-orderings we appeal to in the paper. We provide
a short description of the database in Section 3 and then present the results of the pairwise
comparisons. Section 4 concludes the paper. Finally, we give an overview of the statistical
inference techniques used for implementing our diﬀerent criteria in Appendix A.
2. Social Welfare and Inequality Criteria
We assimilate an income distribution with a random variable X with values in a closed and
bounded interval D ⊆ R. We indicate by Y (D) the set of income distributions and we denote
as F(z;X) the cumulative distribution function of X ∈ Y (D), where z ∈ R. We denote by
F −1(p;X) the quantile function of X deﬁned by F −1(0;X) := inf{z ∈ R|F(z;X) > 0} and
F −1(p;X) := inf{z ∈ R|F(z;X) = p}, for all p ∈ (0,1]. The mean income of X ∈ Y (D) is
indicated by µ(X).
The ﬁrst criterion we appeal to for making welfare comparisons only incorporates consid-
erations for greater eﬃciency. Letting RO(p;X) := F −1(p;X), for all p ∈ [0,1], we have:
Definition 2.1. Given two distributions X,Y ∈ Y (D), we say that X rank-order dominates
Y , which we write X ≥RO Y , if and only if RO(p;X) = RO(p;Y ), for all p ∈ [0,1].
The non-deprivation quasi-ordering builds on the idea according to which a person feels de-
prived if she realises that some other persons enjoy some item she does not have access to, but
sees no reason why she is not entitled to get it (see Runciman (1966)). The non-deprivation
curve ND(p;X) of distribution X ∈ Y (D) indicates for every individual occupying rank p in
the population the average diﬀerence between her income and the incomes of all individuals





−1(q;X), ∀p ∈ (0,1].
Definition 2.2. Given two distributions X,Y ∈ Y (D), we say that X non-deprivation dom-
inates Y , which we write X ≥ND Y , if and only if ND(p;X) = ND(p;Y ), for all p ∈ [0,1].
Following Kolm (1969) and Shorrocks (1983), it is current practice to use the generalised
Lorenz curves to perform welfare comparisons. The generalised Lorenz curve GL(p;X) of





−1(q;X)dq, ∀p ∈ [0,1],
indicates the cumulated income received by every fraction p of the population deﬂated by the
population size. Then, we have:
Definition 2.3. Given two distributions X,Y ∈ Y (D), we say that X generalised Lorenz
dominates Y , which we write X ≥GL Y , if and only if GL(p;X) = GL(p;Y ), for all p ∈ [0,1].
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Magdalou and Moyes (2009) have shown that the three above quasi-orderings are nested in the
sense that ≥RO ⊆ ≥ND ⊆ ≥GL . Therefore, the non-deprivation quasi-ordering provides
a ranking of the distributions under comparison that is more complete than the one resulting
from the application of the rank-order quasi-ordering but less complete than the ranking
implied by the generalised Lorenz quasi-ordering.
The previous approach can be extended to inequality measurement by appropriate normal-
isation of the distributions under comparisons (see, e.g., Moyes (1999)). Letting D ⊆ R++
and dividing every income by the mean, we derive the relative Lorenz curve and the relative
non-deprivation curve of X ∈ Y (D) deﬁned respectively by RL(p;X) := GL(p;X/µ(X))
and RND(p;X) := ND(p;X/µ(X)), for all p ∈ [0,1]. If one subtracts the mean from ev-
ery income, then one obtains the absolute Lorenz curve and the absolute non-deprivation
curve of X ∈ Y (D) given respectively by AL(p;X) := GL(p;X − µ(X)) and AND(p;X) :=
ND(p;X − µ(X)), for all p ∈ [0,1]. Then, the relative Lorenz, relative non-deprivation,
absolute Lorenz, absolute non-deprivation quasi-orderings are deﬁned by comparing the cor-
responding curves as we have done above for the generalised Lorenz and the non-deprivation
quasi-orderings.
3. Empirical Comparisons of the Quasi-Orderings
The LIS database indicates for each household its disposable income (DHI) – that is its total
income after taxation and transfer payments – in local currencies and its composition. We
have converted incomes using the purchasing power parities (PPP) proposed by the OECD to
make them comparable across countries. Furthermore, household incomes have adjusted by
Table 3.1: The countries under comparison
No Country Year DHI per Capita Sample Size
1 Mexico 2000 5 788.32 10 072
2 Poland 1999 6 330.86 30 812
3 Hungary 1999 6 513.81 1 927
4 Greece 2000 13 598.82 3 873
5 Spain 2000 17 627.86 4 761
6 Finland 2000 18 152,60 10 419
7 Sweden 2000 18 356.47 14 471
8 Netherlands 1999 19 249.84 4 331
9 Germany 2000 20 123.77 10 982
10 United Kingdom 1999 20 733.02 24 830
11 Austria 2000 20 945.18 2 329
12 Belgium 2000 21 177.11 2 080
13 Canada 2000 23 583.00 28 902
14 Norway 2000 24 603.77 12 870
15 Switzerland 2000 25 825.90 3 627
16 USA 2000 29 028.81 49 294
17 Luxembourg 2000 29 504.36 2 415
means of the square-root equivalence scale in order to take family needs into account and the
resulting equivalent incomes have been weighted by the number of persons in the household
(see, e.g., Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995)). Table 3.1 gives the list of countries
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we have retained and indicates for each of these the year when the data were collected, the
corresponding adjusted DHIs per capita in $US, and the number of households in the samples.
Because the distributions under comparisons are samples drawn from larger populations,
we have implemented statistical inference using the intersection-union (IU) method advocated
by Howes (1994) and Kaur, Rao, and Singh (1994), and the union-intersection (UI) method
introduced by Bishop, Chakraborti, and Thistle (1989) (see Appendix A for more details).
For each dominance criterion we have performed both tests at a 5% signiﬁcance level. We
only present here the tables giving the results of the pairwise comparisons obtained under the
restrictive IU method for each criterion, and we refer the interested reader to Magdalou and
Moyes (2008, Appendix B) which provides the corresponding tables for the UI method.
Table 3.2 gives the results of the comparisons of the distributions of adjusted household
incomes by the rank order, the generalised Lorenz and the non-deprivation quasi-orderings.
The 17 countries are listed in order of adjusted DHI per capita ranging from the lowest
(Mexico) to the highest (Luxembourg) ﬁgures. The performance of the rank order criterion is
surprisingly good and allows us to rank conclusively 65 out of 136 pairs of countries, hence a
success rate of 47.79%. Application of generalised Lorenz dominance permits to reach deﬁnite
Table 3.2: Social welfare rankings of countries under the IU method
Country j
No Country i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Mexico -N -N -N -R -R -R -N -R -R -R -R -R -R -R -R -R
2 Poland -L -R -R -R -R -R -R -R -R -R -R -R -R -R -R
3 Hungary # # -R -R -R -R -R -R -R -R -R -R -R -R
4 Greece # -R -R -N -R -R -R -R -R -R -R # -R
5 Spain -N -N -N -N -R -N -N -R -R -R # -R
6 Finland # # # # # # # # # # -R
7 Sweden # # # -L # # -R -R # -R
8 Netherlands # # # # # # # # -R
9 Germany # # # # -R -R # -R
10 United Kingdom # # # -N -R # -N
11 Austria # # # -R # -R
12 Belgium # # -L # -N
13 Canada -N -R # -N
14 Norway # # -N
15 Switzerland # -N
16 USA -N
17 Luxembourg
Legend “−R” if country i is rank-order dominated by country j.
“−N” if country i is non-deprivation dominated by country j.
“−L” if country i is generalised Lorenz dominated by country j.
“#” if countries i and j are not comparable by the three social welfare quasi-orderings.
conclusions in 87 out of 136 cases, which gives a success rate of 63.97% and conﬁrms that
the ranking generated by the generalised Lorenz criterion is ﬁner than the one implied by the
rank order criterion. Contrary to what might have been anticipated, the substitution of the
non-deprivation quasi-ordering for the generalised Lorenz one does not result in a signiﬁcant
decrease in the number of pairs of countries that can be ranked. As it can be checked in Table
3.2, the rankings of countries provided by the generalised Lorenz and the non-deprivation
quasi-orderings are almost identical. The only diﬀerence concerns three pairs of countries
that are ordered by the generalised Lorenz criterion while they are not comparable under
the non-deprivation criterion: Poland and Hungary, Sweden and Austria, and Belgium and
Switzerland.
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The application of the standard Lorenz tests and of the non-deprivation based criteria to
the comparisons of inequality results in more contrasted pictures. Table 3.3 indicates the
results of the pairwise comparisons of countries on the basis of the relative Lorenz and of the
relative non-deprivation quasi-orderings. Similarly, the rankings of countries generated by
Table 3.3: Relative inequality rankings of countries under the IU method
Country j
No Country i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Mexico -N -N -N -N -N -N -N -N -N -N # -N -N -N # -N
2 Poland # # # # # -N # # -N # # # # -L -N
3 Hungary # # # # # # +N # # # # # +N -N
4 Greece # # # -N # # -L # # # # +N -N
5 Spain # # -N -L # -N # # # # +L -N
6 Finland # # # +N # +N +N # +N +L #
7 Sweden # # +N # # +N # # +L #
8 Netherlands # +N # # +N # # +N #
9 Germany +N # # +N # # +N -L
10 United Kingdom # # # # -N # -N
11 Austria # +N # # +N #
12 Belgium # # # # -N
13 Canada # -L +L -N
14 Norway # # #
15 Switzerland +L -N
16 USA -N
17 Luxembourg
Legend “+N” if country i relative non-deprivation dominates country j.
“−N” if country i is relative non-deprivation dominated by country j.
“+L” if country i relative Lorenz dominates country j.
“−L” if country i is relative Lorenz dominated by country j.
“#” if countries i and j are not comparable by the two relative inequality quasi-orderings.
Table 3.4: Absolute inequality rankings of countries under the IU method
Country j
No Country i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Mexico # # # +N +N +L # +N +N # +N +N +N +N +N +N
2 Poland # +N +N +N +N +L +N +N +N +N +N +N +N +N +N
3 Hungary +N +N +N +N +N +N +N +N +N +N +N +N +N +N
4 Greece +N # # # +N +N # +N +N +N +N +N +N
5 Spain # # # # +N # # +N +L +N +N #
6 Finland # # # +N # +N +N +N +N +N +L
7 Sweden # +L +N # +N +N +N +N +N +L
8 Netherlands +N +N +L +N +N +N +N +N +N
9 Germany +N # # +N +N +N +N +L
10 United Kingdom # # # # # +L #
11 Austria # +N +N +N +N +N
12 Belgium # # # # #
13 Canada # # +N #
14 Norway # +L #
15 Switzerland +L #
16 USA -N
17 Luxembourg
Legend “+N” if country i absolute non-deprivation dominates country j.
“−N” if country i is absolute non-deprivation dominated by country j.
“+L” if country i absolute Lorenz dominates country j.
“−L” if country i is absolute Lorenz dominated by country j.
“#” if countries i and j are not comparable by the two absolute inequality quasi-orderings.
the absolute Lorenz and by the absolute non-deprivation quasi-orderings are summarised in
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Table 3.5: Success rates of the social welfare and inequality quasi-orderings
RO ND GL RND RL AND AL
IU Test
Nb 65 84 87 46 56 82 93
(%) (47.79) (61.76) (63.97) (33.82) (41.18) (60.29) (68.38)
UI Test
Nb 84 101 104 86 101 107 117
(%) (61.76) (74.26) (76.47) (63.24) (74.26) (78.68) (86.03)
Table 3.4. A ﬁrst remark is that, on the whole, the inequality quasi-orderings are far less
discriminatory than the corresponding welfare quasi-orderings. This originates in part in the
fact that the size eﬀect due to diﬀerences in disposable per capita income, which explains much
of the rankings of countries obtained on the basis of the welfare criteria, is eliminated through
the normalisation procedures used in the deﬁnition of our inequality criteria. A second remark
is that the inequality quasi-orderings rooted in the notion of non-deprivation are less powerful
than those derived from the generalised Lorenz curve, something which is more in line with our
expectations. This is particularly the case for relative inequality where the non-deprivation
approach permits us to rank only 46 pairs of countries out of 136, while the relative Lorenz
quasi-ordering is able to establish a conclusive verdict in 56 cases. As a consequence the
success rate falls from 41.18% to 33.82% when the relative non-deprivation quasi-ordering is
substituted for the relative Lorenz quasi-ordering. A similar situation obtains in the case of
absolute inequality: application of the absolute Lorenz criterion allows to rank 93 pairs of
countries (68.38% of the cases), while this ﬁgure falls only to 82 (60.29% of the cases) when
one appeals to the absolute non-deprivation quasi-ordering.
Finally, we note that substituting the more liberal UI method for the IU one results in an
appreciable gain in decisiveness, as it is shown in Table 3.5. However, this does not aﬀect the
general conclusions drawn from the application of the dominance criteria.
4. Conclusion
Contrary to what might have been expected, our empirical investigation suggests that the
non-deprivation quasi-ordering performs rather well as compared with the generalised Lorenz
quasi-ordering. Things are more contrasted as far as inequality comparisons are concerned,
but still there the non-deprivation based inequality quasi-orderings do not perform too badly
by comparison with the standard relative and absolute Lorenz criteria. Although it is certainly
premature to generalise, this empirical study provides a response to a serious objection that
could be made against the non-deprivation criteria, precisely their lower degrees of decisiveness
as compared with the Lorenz criteria. In addition, the application of the non-deprivation quasi-
ordering provides additional information about the nature of the equalising process that leads
to the domination of one distribution by another.
A. Statistical Inference Tests
Let incomes be grouped into K quantiles with abscissa pk := k/K, where k ∈ K :=
{1,2,...,K} and K = 100. Following Beach, Chow, Formby, and Slotsve (1994), we esti-
mate the quantile mean µk(X) by
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where c X is the sample distribution corresponding to X ∈ Y (D). We compute the sam-
ple curve J(c X) := (J(p1; c X),J(p2; c X),...,J(pK; c X)) for each J ∈ {RO,ND,GL,RND,RL,
AND,AL}. We denote by γk(X) the cumulative mean of rank-ordered incomes up to pk
and we estimate it by γk(c X) := GL(pk; c X)/pk. The corresponding cumulative variance is
indicated by λk(X) and its sample estimator by λk(c X) := GL(pk;(c X − µk(c X))2)/pk. Beach
and Davidson (1983) have shown that the vector GL(c X) is – under reasonable conditions –




2 + (1 − pk)(µi(X) − γi(X))
(µk(X) − γk(X))(µi(X) − γi(X)) +
(γk(X) − γi(X))],
for 1 5 i 5 k 5 K. For all the curves J(c X), it can be shown that there exists a matrix
R
J := [rJ




∂ J(pi; c X)
∂ GL(pk; c X)
,
for all i,k ∈ K . It follows from Rao (1965) that J(c X) is asymptotically normal with mean




J)T. Thus, in order to compare
two incomes distributions X,Y ∈ Y (D) by means of the quasi-ordering J, we can use for each

































where n(c X) and n(b Y ) are the sample sizes of c X and b Y , respectively.
According to the IU method, non-dominance constitutes the null hypothesis:
H0(X,Y ) : ∃k ∈ K | J(pk;X) − J(pk;Y ) < 0 and
H1(X,Y ) : J(pk;X) − J(pk;Y ) = 0, ∀k ∈ K .
The curve J(X) is signiﬁcantly above the curve J(Y ) at abscissa pk if and only if Zα < Tk,
where Zα is the critical value for a signiﬁcance level of α derived from Student’s t-distribution.
We ﬁrst test H0(X,Y ) against H1(X,Y ): either we accept H1(X,Y ) in which case distribution
X weakly dominates distribution Y , or we reject H1(X,Y ) and we move to the second stage
where H1(Y,X) is tested against H0(Y,X). Then, either we accept H1(Y,X) and distribution
Y weakly dominates distribution X, or we reject H1(Y,X) and we conclude that distributions
X and Y are non-comparable. The sequence of tests for the IU method is summarised in
Figure A.1, where “X #J Y ” indicates that the distributions X and Y are non-comparable
according to the J criterion. Application of the IU rule leads to the conclusion that:
X ≥J Y ⇐⇒ Zα < min{Tk},
Y ≥J X ⇐⇒ max{Tk} < −Zα,
X and Y are non-comparable otherwise,
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Figure A.1: Test procedure under the IU method











 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
H0(X,Y ) vs H1(X,Y )
X ≥J Y
H1(X,Y )
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
We note that this method does not allow for equivalence: either one country weakly dominates
the other one, or the two countries are non-comparable.
On the contrary, equivalence constitutes the null hypothesis in the UI method:
H0(X,Y ) : J (pk;X) − J (pk;Y ) = 0, ∀k ∈ K and
H1(X,Y ) : ∃k ∈ K | J (pk;Y ) − J (pk;X) > 0 .
In a ﬁrst step, we test H0(X,Y ) against H1(X,Y ) and there are two possibilities. If we
accept H0(X,Y ), then we test in a second stage H0(Y,X) against H1(Y,X): either we accept
H0(Y,X), in which case we conclude that distributions X and Y are equivalent, or we accept
H1(Y,X) and we conclude that distribution Y strongly dominates distribution X. If in the
ﬁrst step we accept H1(X,Y ), then we test in a second stage H0(Y,X) against H1(Y,X):
either we accept H0(Y,X), in which case we conclude that distribution X strongly dominates
distribution Y , or we accept H1(Y,X) and we conclude that distributions X and Y are
non-comparable. We have represented in Figure A.2 the test procedure for the UI method.
Application of the UI rule allows us to conclude that:
Figure A.2: Test procedure under the UI method











 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
H0(X,Y ) vs H1(X,Y )
H0(Y,X) vs H1(Y,X)
H1(X,Y )
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X >J Y ⇐⇒ −Cα < min{Tk} and Cα < max{Tk},
Y >J X ⇐⇒ min{Tk} < −Cα and max{Tk} < Cα,
Y ∼J X ⇐⇒ −Cα < min{Tk} and max{Tk} < Cα,
X and Y are non-comparable otherwise,
where Cα is the critical value for a signiﬁcance level of α determined from the Student Maxi-
mum Modulus (SMM) distribution provided by Stoline and Ury (1979).
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